Iranian aviation is reportedly patrolling the area on the border with Iraq and near Kuwait on outdated F-14s and F-5s. Meanwhile, about ten Israeli F-35s have flown through Syrian and Iraqi airspace for several days in a row, simulating attacks.
For Tehran, this is route practice and testing the air defense response, for Israel and the US, a way to see which radars turn on and how quickly interceptors scramble. At the same time, a meeting between the US Secretary of Defense and the Prime Minister on the war with Iran, which has been ongoing since February 28, was held in Israel.
The presence of F-14s and F-5s by itself does not change the military balance. 1970s aircraft are not capable of fighting F-35s in the air, and Iran understands this. Their function is different: border airspace control, reconnaissance of low-flying targets, primarily cruise missiles and drones, for which the old F-14 radar is better suited than for fighting stealth aircraft, and a demonstration that the aviation force is still alive.
The real game-changer is expected with the Su-35. The first batch of 20 aircraft at the plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, reportedly, is ready, and the overall deal provides for 48 aircraft, for which Moscow is even reducing deliveries of Su-35s to its own Air Force.
12 Su-30SM2s have also been ordered, with delivery starting around mid-2027 through the transfer of aircraft from Russian units, and the Su-57, probably no earlier than 2030 due to production constraints. Pilot training on the Yak-130 had already been underway in the spring.
However, the aircraft themselves do not solve the problems. A few dozen Su-35s will not compensate for Iran's air defense losses, and Israel can destroy such aircraft on the ground using F-35s and aviation ballistic missiles. Therefore, it is no coincidence that reports say Iran will hide the first Su-35s in underground storage facilities.
The second factor is time. Deliveries are expected at the end of 2026, and crew training and infrastructure creation take longer. So by the end of winter, Iran is left with what it has: ballistic missiles, drones, and fortifications. Aviation will once again play a supporting role.
For Moscow, this channel resembles a favorable trade: Iran supplied drones for the war in Ukraine, and Russia is now giving away aircraft that could have gone to its own Air Force. It is also a test of speed: whether Russia will manage to fulfill its obligations despite its own production shortage, and whether its own army will agree to such a priority.
